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## INTRODUCTION

International migration has been central to the development, consolidation and transformation of the state system on a global scale. This chapter shows how, why and with what effects international migration has been shaped by the state system. By this is meant that it is the constitution of the state system and socio-economic inequalities within and between states that play a key role in conditioning and shaping international migration. Economic inequalities and other related factors that can produce international migration are closely linked to the causes and effects of the state system. As states change – become richer or poorer, for example – then so too does international migration in its many and various forms (to work, to study, to join family members or to seek refuge, for example). To develop and explore this key aspect of the relationship between the state and the regulation of international migration, this chapter examines dynamics in Europe, North America and the post-Soviet space. These are all regions that have been shaped by international migration, but that also display differences in terms of forms of state, types of regulation, relations between states and development of supranational governance.

The regulation of international migration is an area where we could expect to see powerful expression of state sovereignty evident in the controls, security and monitoring that occur at the borders of states (Arendt 1958). Over the last 25 years there has been a significant increase in the resources (both financial and symbolic) devoted to border control and border security in the world’s major destination countries, but there is also some evidence of cross-national dynamics plus, in Europe, cooperation and policy-making on migration above the state at supranational level.

The chapter develops an approach that has two key elements. The first is a focus on states as the key locations for the regulation of migration. However, rather than seeing international migration as a challenge to these states (as some kind of external threat or challenge), this chapter explores the ways in which states, relationships between states and the constitution of governance systems play a key role in shaping international migration. The second is a focus on what has been called ‘boundary build-up’, which explores the dynamics of regulation by looking at how and why greater openness to certain flows such as of goods, capital and services can be accompanied by attempts to exert tighter controls on movement of people. In short, the chapter seeks not to assess how states respond to international migration (which tends to construe the role of states as relatively passive) but, instead, to look at ways in which states shape international migration.

While the regulation of migration is necessarily closely linked to the sovereign authority and identity of these states, there is also some similar dynamics and institutionalisation of international norms and standards that can, to some extent, constrain states. International cooperation can also provide states working together with opportunities to attain objectives that would not be possible acting alone. Scholarly works on migration in European and US history have shown how international migration in its various forms plays a key role in how states define and understand themselves as ‘population containers’ (Taylor 1995; Zolberg 2006; Bade 2008), but also how they relate

to other states in the international system. These borders are territorial and external, but also, as discussed later in this chapter, can be internal and within states in the sense of being organisational and conceptual boundaries that define relationships between insiders and outsiders in complex and multiple ways (Geddes 2005). These borders and the various kinds of controls that are exerted towards them powerfully represent and reflect inequalities within the global system. Inequalities of income and wealth are and will remain key migration drivers. International migration is thus embedded within a series of broader questions about the structure and effects of the global political economy.

These observations also have a methodological implication that will inform this chapter. It is common to represent international migration as a challenge to the state, as some kind of external threat (Weiner 1995). The argument developed in this chapter is that this understanding can neglect the ways in which international migration is constituted by the operation and effects of governance systems. Put another way, rather than seeing international migration as an independent variable and then trying to understand its impacts on states, we prefer to explore the ways in which governance (broadly understood, see below) plays a key role in the construction of international migration as a social and political issue. Moreover, as Heisler (1992) showed, international migration is an issue that cuts across governance levels from the subnational to the national to the international. If we are to understand the role played by the state in the regulation of migration then it is important to be attuned to this multilevel context.

The analysis in this chapter is developed in three main sections. The first explores the ways in which international migration is powerfully shaped by inequalities within the global political economy. The second section considers the ways in which the regulation of migration can be used to view and understand the development, consolidation and transformation of states. The third draws empirical evidence from North America, Europe and the post-Soviet space to consider the efforts that have been made in three parts of the world where migration has been a central social and political concern and where there have been significant differences in responses.

## THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION

The understanding of governance that is developed in this chapter has two main components: the conceptual representation of social systems, and the empirical analysis of their capacity to adapt (Pierre 2000). This requires specification of underlying social systems and their relationship to migration. This is done by exploring the effects of and interactions between economic, social, political, demographic and environmental factors, and the ways in which they shape international migration (Black et al. 2011; Geddes et al. 2012).

Of central importance are the operation and effects of economic systems as key drivers of migration. It is well established that relative inequalities in income and wealth play a key role in driving international migration by shaping decisions made at household level about whether or not to migrate. These inequalities can be a driver of migration, but not in a simple 'push' fashion. Conceiving them only as a push factor would not account for key variables such as the distance or duration of migration, or the question of who migrates, with particularly important implications for gender as well as age. The implication is that state efforts to regulate international migration may well be *ex post* responses to the drivers or triggers of migration. Migration tends to be strongly related to

change in underlying factors such as inequalities of wealth or income, or the effects of conflict and instability.

It is, however, also important to bear in mind that such inequalities are not a simple trigger mechanism. Only around 3 per cent of the world's population – about 210 million people – are international migrants (World Bank 2011). Most people do not move internationally. This may well be because they have no need or inclination to undertake a potentially disruptive and hazardous activity. However, poverty and inequality can also mean that people are unable to move. As a result, inequalities can help 'keep people in their place' while development policies can reinforce this tendency with a 'sedentary bias' that sees migration as part of the problem rather than a potential solution to relative inequalities of wealth and income (Bakewell 2008; see also de Haas 2005). This is an important point, because both the effects and intentions of governance may be more likely to keep people where they are rather than lead to international migration. There can also be strong links between those that move and those that do not move. So, for example, family members who stay behind might receive remittances, but these remittances can also have both positive and negative social and economic effects on the places that migrants move from.

While economic factors play a key role in shaping international migration (who moves, who does not, where people move to, for how long, and so on), it is also the case that economic factors will interact with a range of other factors that are also central to the operation and effects of governance systems. The first of these is the well-documented role played by social networks as causes and effects of international migration (Massey et al. 1993; Massey et al. 1999). There is a powerful network base to migration and we know that 'cumulative causation' can, among other things, mean that migration networks, once established, can exist in a powerful tension with border controls (Myrdal and Anshen 1958; Massey 1990; de Haas 2010). This can lead to a tension between the social dynamics of migration and state-centred logics of control that reinforce the idea of migration as a problem because of its subversive aspects.

Once again, however, it is important to note that social factors can play a role in structuring or influencing migration, but that the operation and effects of these networks may be to enable some migratory strategies and constrain others. So, for example, those connected to previous migrants may benefit from opportunities for movement themselves or may be the recipients of finances linked to migration such as remittances. Others, without these connections, cannot. This re-emphasises the point about the centrality of both migration and non-migration to an assessment of the state and the regulation of migration.

A further set of factors that can play a part in driving migration is the impact of political factors such as conflict and the breakdown of governance systems on migration. Those fleeing persecution can seek to access the international protection system, but there are many people who are displaced from conflict zones but are not able to access international protection. For example, in October 2013, the Italian government's Mare Nostrum policy was a response to increased movement of people from conflict-ridden areas in the Middle East and Africa; although the scheme was phased out in November 2014 to be replaced by a much more limited operation called Triton focused on border control rather than search and rescue. Mare Nostrum was introduced following the death of 366 men, women and children off the coast of Italy. By June 2014, more than 75 000 people had been rescued at sea. While the European Union (EU) crisis can be distorted by talk of 'invasion' and 'swamping', it is important to bear in mind that most displacement is short-

distance to neighbouring states. For example, by November 2014, more than 3 million Syrians had fled across the border to neighbouring states such as Lebanon and Jordan, while others were effectively trapped in cities such as Aleppo where they were exposed to conflict and extreme danger.

Economic, social and political factors will also link with demographic factors. A 'youth bulge' was identified in the 21 Middle East and North African (MENA) countries with younger, relatively well-educated people seen as more likely to move (Fargues 2008). The demographic profile of MENA countries alone does not directly determine migration, but demographic factors interact with economic, social and political factors to shape who moves and the distance and duration of their movement.

Finally, environmental factors can play a role in driving migration. Changes such as land degradation but also the effects of climate change are unlikely to act as simple trigger mechanisms, but will interact with wealth and income inequalities as well as the other factors specified above, to have powerful influences on migration (Geddes et al. 2012).

To summarise, this chapter develops an approach that focuses on migration as a challenge of governance and that seeks to identify the key governance drivers of migration. Particular importance is ascribed to the effects of relative wealth and income inequalities, but also their interaction with social, political, demographic and environmental changes. These are not understood as simple trigger mechanisms: some people will migrate, but the scale and duration of movement as well as the question of who moves will be shaped by a range of factors that cannot be understood in simple push–pull terms. Rather, it is important to think about the ways in which states condition and affect both migration and non-migration.

## STATES AND THEIR BORDERS

The previous section has emphasised that we need to understand how and with what effects states condition international migration, and also to see the decisions that states make as embedded within the international system and, more specifically, income and wealth inequalities and a range of other factors, that can play a key role in driving international migration and non-migration. This emphasises the point made at the start of the chapter about the need to connect the regulation of migration in particular states with the broader setting within which this regulation occurs, which is necessarily defined by relationships with other states and by forms of international governance. This is not to overemphasise the coherence of this international setting. There is no single, unified, global governance setting, and one seems unlikely to develop given interest divergence in the international system. As will be shown, there is a 'regime complex' of fragmented, overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions that does create some potential for action at the international level (Betts 2010; Keohane and Victor 2011).

The remainder of this section explores the national settings, which remain centrally important to the regulation of migration. State borders can be understood as comprising three main components (with hugely variable distribution across the world). These are territorial borders; organisational boundaries, particularly of work and welfare; and conceptual borders of identity and belonging. They all play a powerful role in mediating relationships between migrants, the places they leave and the places to which they move.

Territorial borders are the most obvious sites at which international migration is made visible. These are the land, air and sea ports at which migrants must present themselves and make a claim for entry based on the possession of valid and appropriate documentation that permits entry for a specific purpose and duration. This is the 'core business' of the state regulation of migration; entry for work, to study, to seek refuge, to join with family members are the main types of admission criteria. Each of these can then be broken down into various other categories. Each of these categories reflects a decision made by the destination country about who can enter and who cannot. This is necessarily a discriminatory process that has also involved racial and ethnic discrimination (Joppke 2005; Cook-Martin and FitzGerald 2014) with the perceived economic contribution of would-be migrants now a powerful driver of discrimination at national borders.

There is another side to entry processes at national borders, which is the evasions that they generate. As noted in the previous section, migration is necessarily linked to inequalities in the international system, as noted by Portes (1979) in his analysis of Mexico–US migration and the formation of 'illegal' immigration. Border controls and restrictive immigration policies do little to deal with these root causes of migration. This means that the demand for migration can remain high while the borders that people encounter get higher and higher. Zolberg (1989) captured this when noting the tension between 'walls and doors'. He argued that the politics of immigration in the world's major destination states centres on the tension between the building of walls and the opening of small doors in those walls for small group of privileged migrants. However, building the wall ever higher does not reduce the demand for migration, it only makes migration more dangerous. We need only look at the loss of life at the EU's southern border and at the US–Mexico border to see this (Cornelius 2001; Carling 2007). There is a broader point here too about the ways that border controls stimulate illegality and foster the development of criminal networks; for example, at the US–Mexico border people and drugs moving north and weapons moving south. Similar dynamics are evident at other border zones too, such as the borders between Russia and Kazakhstan (Olekh 2008) or borders in Central Asia (Jackson 2005).

It is not only territorial borders that are important. Organisational borders and boundaries are internal to states and can be particularly evident in terms of access to work and social rights. Here too we see tension between migrants and host societies regarding access to the labour market and the access to social benefits. In addition to organisational borders are the nebulous but no less important conceptual boundaries of belonging, entitlement and identity. These can involve ethnic, cultural and racial distinctions between insiders and outsiders (Geddes 2005).

To sum up, borders and boundaries are fundamental to the analysis of the state and the regulation of migration. This section has identified the projection of state power and authority at the external borders, but also suggested capacity constraints as evident in the evasions that occur at these borders. It has also suggested that we need to broaden the focus not only to include territorial borders, but also to think about organisational and conceptual borders. As we see, the notion of boundary build-up captures the relationship between territorial control and a series of internal concerns about the maintenance of key institutions and forms of identity within states. The chapter now proceeds to explore three regional settings in order to examine the relationship between territorial control and the maintenance of internal boundaries, that can be ethno-cultural, socio-economic or bio-physical, and all

related to ideas and practices associated with security understood not only in interstate terms but also in broader societal terms (Wæver et al. 1993).

## EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE AND THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

### **North America**

Thus far the chapter has explored the effects of governance on international migration and of the centrality of various types of border. We now move on to assess the concept of ‘boundary build-up’ and its application to US–Mexico border relationships, before considering the relevance of this idea to developments in the EU and post-Soviet space (Purcell and Nevins 2005).

The Mexico–US border is a key site for analysis of the issues that are necessarily central to any assessment of the role played by the state in the regulation of international migration. Huge resources – both financial and symbolic – have been invested by the US authorities in border security, while the issue of immigration reform remains bogged down in partisan political debate. The development of the Mexico–US border and of associated flows and controls can be understood to represent ‘complex interchanges between state actors and groups of citizens [which] produced a deep set of concerns about the ethno-cultural, socio-economic and bio-physical security of the nation, all of which are inherently geographical given their inextricable relationship to a particular territory’ (Purcell and Nevins 2005: 213). The outcome is a form of boundary-build-up that has a territorial expression, but is centred on the relationship between control of external frontiers and the maintenance of borders and boundaries that are within the state. The result is that ‘boundary build-up was thus a territorial strategy to achieve the security and assuage those concerns’ (ibid.).

Such tensions have been evident at the US–Mexican border and also at the external frontiers of EU member states (Andreas and Snyder 2000; Gatev 2008). They are indicative of a complex relationship between regional integration that seeks liberalization in movement of goods, capital and services, but has a far more ambivalent relationship to population mobility. The regional context is also important as it encompasses bilateral relations between states as well as forms of multilateral cooperation. There is regional integration in North America in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but this is strongly intergovernmental in character, mainly trade-focused, and contains no provisions for migration. A key justification for this cooperation was that it would promote factor price equalisation that would reduce migratory pressures. Potential trade efficiencies are key drivers of regionalism, but these arguments from economic theory encounter the specific modes and forms of politics. To take one example of the relationship between regionalism and the politics of immigration, an explicit rationale provided for the NAFTA agreement by Presidents Salinas of Mexico and Clinton of the United States was that free trade in goods and services could contribute to closer alignment of factor prices across the US–Mexican border and reduce migratory pressures. In May 1993 Mexican President Salinas said that: ‘Free trade is the way to increase growth and employment ... and NAFTA is a migration-reduction agreement, because Mexicans will not have to migrate north looking for jobs in this country, but will be able to find them in my own’. In

October 1993 President Clinton contended that: ‘if you want to have the immigration problem eased, you must vote for NAFTA and not against it’ (both cited in Flores-Macías 2007: 150). For its proponents, NAFTA would lead to foreign direct investment (FDI) flowing into the labour-intensive country (Mexico), generating new employment and deterring emigration to the United States. This has been questioned by Flores-Macías (2007: 150) who argues that ‘imperfect integration’ within NAFTA has exacerbated rather than eased immigration pressures. Flores-Macías (2007) assesses the effects of this so-called imperfect integration through the NAFTA agreement, which contains no explicit reference to migration, referring only to temporary movement by businesspersons. The NAFTA agreement ‘was explicit as to the inexistence of obligations among the Parties concerning access to employment markets’ (Flores-Macías 2007: 151). Migration was also excluded from what is known as the NAFTA labour side agreement.

Mexico–US migration relations have changed since the 2008 financial crisis, with lower migration levels. There is also evidence of more complex migration dynamics as Mexico is a sending country but also a transit country and, increasingly, a destination country. Looking at the 1990s and early 2000s, Flores-Macías identified five reasons for the persistence of high levels of labour migration from Mexico to the United States. First, there has been insufficient growth in jobs to meet the demands caused by population growth and economic restructuring in Mexico, such as the effect of major agricultural reforms. Second, the Mexican–US income gap has increased. Third, *maquiladoras* (foreign-owned plants set up on the Mexican side of the border to use imported parts to assemble products for export) have employed women workers at relatively low wages, disrupted family structures, and served to encourage men to migrate to the United States. Fourth, migration networks have become consolidated over time. Fifth, migration is a social as well as an economic phenomenon, and the USA continues to exert a strong cultural pull in migrant communities, even when the costs of migration (such as exposure to people smuggling networks) outweigh the benefits in a rational analysis (Flores-Macías 2007: 156). In their assessment of NAFTA’s effects, Massey and Espinosa (1997: 991–2) identify how it helped to:

bring about the social and economic transformations that generate migrants. The integration of the North American market will also create new links of transportation, telecommunication, and interpersonal acquaintance, connections that are necessary for the efficient movement of goods, information, and capital, but which also encourage and promote the movement of people – students, business executives, tourists, and, ultimately, undocumented workers.

If we consider the US–Mexico and NAFTA setting in a comparative perspective then a more general dynamic becomes evident at the boundaries between developed and less-developed countries which can be understood as:

a more complex and paradoxical dynamic: the expansion of cross-border economic activity and the decline of geopolitical tensions are paralleled by a rapid expansion of border policing and rising tensions over prohibited cross-border flows. This is evident, most strikingly, along the United States–Mexico border and along the external borders of the European Union. These borders are increasingly protected

and monitored, not to deter armies or impose tariffs on trade, but to confront a perceived invasion of ‘undesirables,’ particularly illegal immigrants, drug traffickers, and other clandestine transnational actors (Andreas 1998: 591).

### **Europe and the European Union**

In Europe too we see the resonance of territorial borders, but also a complex relationship to internal boundaries that centre on ethno-cultural, socio-economic and biophysical concerns that are all associated in some form with the idea and practice of security.

There have been radical transformations in Europe, with important implications for migration. This is because the EU changes the meaning of border relationships between participating states because of EU free movement while seeking to externalise the regulation of migration by non-EU nationals to those states at the external frontiers of the EU, particularly those to the south and east. The key difference between NAFTA and the EU is that the EU is a system of supranational governance. Treaties agreed between states have been turned into laws that bind those states. This capacity to make and enforce laws that bind its members is the EU’s distinguishing feature.

A key distinction within the EU is between free movement as a right guaranteed in EU law for citizens of the 28 member states and migration by non-EU citizens. Provisions for free movement were made within the Treaty of Rome (initially for workers) and then extended to a more generalized right of free movement for EU citizens with only limited restrictions. EU laws provide for equal access to employment and key services such as housing and health care while outlawing discrimination on the ground of nationality (Geddes 2008; Boswell and Geddes 2011). Provisions for passport-free travel were initially made within what is known as the Schengen system (named after the eponymous town in Luxembourg at which the agreement was signed in 1984). The Schengen system provides for passport-free travel with compensating security measures. Schengen initially developed outside of the formal treaty framework as a ‘laboratory’ for the kinds of measures that would need to be introduced if free movement were to be operationalized (Monar 2004). The Schengen system was formally incorporated into the EU’s legal framework by the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999. This also put in place the legal tools within the Treaty framework to develop a common EU migration and asylum policy.

Immediately, we can see important differences in terms of governance between NAFTA and the EU. The EU is a much more distinct and distinctive governance setting with institutional and legal processes above the state that simply do not exist within NAFTA. As a result, EU migration provisions both for free movement and for migration and asylum have important implications for migration relations within and between European countries (Geddes 2005). A simple dichotomy that posits supranational dynamics in opposition to state-centred intergovernmentalism fails to capture the ways in which the EU is a hybrid of both these elements. Wallace (2010; see also Slaughter 2004) identifies intensive transgovernmentalism as a governance mode centred on intense collaboration between ministers and officials from participating states, organized on a sectoral basis around migration policy. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 was a further significant stage in the development of a common migration and asylum policy, but it is important to note that this policy covers some, but not all, aspects of policy. A key exclusion is that the numbers of migrants to be admitted remains a matter for the member states.

EU action has focused on other areas. A Common European Asylum System was developed in the aftermath of the Amsterdam Treaty and then further developed after the Lisbon treaty. This contains a mix of regulation and directives – the EU’s legal outputs – that bind participating member states (Britain, Ireland, Denmark can opt out). In addition to asylum, measures have also been agreed on family reunification, the rights of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, and on expulsion (Peers et al. 2012).

A key issue for the EU has been the way in which migration has been shaped by dynamics associated with enlargement. Between 2004 and 2013 the EU grew in size from 15 to 28 member states. Of particular importance was the incorporation of countries in Central and Eastern Europe within the EU. A key component of the debate about their membership was migration and border control, with concern about the international borders of inequality to the EU’s south and east. There has been an intensification of EU action on border security, marked by the creation of the European agency for the management of operational cooperation on border controls (FRONTEX) as well as initiatives such as the Eurosur surveillance system. While the governance context is very different, we can see in the EU similar concerns about securing the external frontiers of the member states while at the same time pursuing greater liberalization of flows of goods, capital and services within the EU’s single market (Léonard 2010).

Developments in the EU demonstrate how underlying patterns of governance shape and condition international migration, and that responses to international migration are an effect, not a cause, of changes in governance. In the EU, this has taken the form of the fundamental changes in relations between European states since the 1950s that have centred, in particular, on economic integration. States still play a key role in the regulation of migration, but the nature and form of responses within the EU have changed. EU states now use the EU as a means to attain objectives by acting collectively, but also expose themselves to the social, political and legal effects associated with European integration, such as exposure to the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on migration.

### **The Post-Soviet Space**

Migration in the post-Soviet space is a function of the profound transformations that have occurred in governance systems within the states of the region, as well as at interstate level since the major geopolitical shifts brought about by the end of the Cold War. The dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) initiated ‘the great migration’ (de Tinguy 2004) that still continues. The major difference between the post-Soviet space, NAFTA and the EU is that, until 1991, all the countries in this region were part of the same state – the USSR – that controlled all major policies, including migration. Soviet policy was characterised by extreme restrictiveness with very limited possibilities for either immigration or emigration. The emergence of the new independent states led to development of independent migration policies in each country as – almost overnight – Soviet administrative borders were transformed into fully fledged international boundaries (Gavriliis 2008). The perception, functioning and often dysfunctioning of these borders that reflect deeper dynamics of statehood and governance in the region have had significant impact on migration and, consequently, on responses to migration in these post-Soviet states.

In the post-Soviet region, border policies tend to have as their primary focus hard security that is reflective of an obsession with securing newly obtained sovereignty. Such approaches have had an impact on regional migration dynamics. The build-up of territorial boundaries has been a key priority since the Soviet army ceased to be the guardian of the region's external borders.

In the case of Russia, this focus on border security has had some constraining effects on migration, particularly through various agreements aimed to protect its borders and counter 'illegal' immigration that Russia concluded with many of its neighbours (Korneev 2012). Yet, the space within the external borders of the post-Soviet region remains of special value to Russia and can provide its inhabitants with certain benefits as regards migration. There is a significant difference from the Mexican–US border due to the relatively liberal visa-free border crossing regime that exists between Russia and other countries of the post-Soviet space (except for Georgia and Turkmenistan), allowing their citizens to enter Russia freely and stay for up to three months without any special permission.

As well as the reinvention and reinforcement of geographical and infrastructural borders, other factors have been important drivers of migration in the region. The disintegration of the formerly united Soviet space has led to rapid and often unpredictable changes in many political and socio-economic processes within the newly independent states. As a result, political trends in the underlying governance dynamics played a key role in defining migration in the wake of the Soviet Union's break-up. Conflicts both within states (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and, most recently, Ukraine) and between states (Armenia and Azerbaijan) have displaced people, mostly to Russia (Buckley et al. 2008; Ivakhniouk 2003). Other important governance dynamics – such as ethno-nationalism, chosen as a foundational stone for state-building in some newly independent states (for example, Latvia, Estonia and to a lesser degree Lithuania, as well as Central Asian countries) – led to significant outflows of so-called 'Russian speakers' from these countries to Russia (Flynn 2004; Korobkov and Zaionchkovskaia 2004). These transformations and the emergence of new independent governance systems occurred in conditions of economic stagnation and structural economic crisis. Abrupt economic disintegration of the post-Soviet space after the break-up of the USSR was followed by attempts at economic reintegration. A series of subsequent economic crises have also been major drivers and constraints on migration (IOM 2009).

The USSR constructed and sustained probably one of the most restrictive migration regimes in the world, as it was almost entirely closed to immigration and exerted strong control over internal migration. Dissolution of the USSR meant that fledgling post-Soviet states faced the challenge of designing and implementing their own migration policies. Their steps in this direction have often been unsteady and the evolution of migration policies in the region shows that there have been many twists and turns over a relatively short period, with migration policies tending to be reactive and short-term.

Russia, in particular, has had to adapt to its role as a 'new' immigration country. In little more than 20 years since the break-up of the USSR, Russian migration policy has gone through a series of fluctuations from liberal to illiberal to, once again, more open approaches. The context for these changes is different from that in the contemporary EU, with migration that has been described as post-colonial (de Tinguy 2004) structured by an economic context with some of the countries in the region amongst the world's poorest and

with a very heavy reliance on migrant remittances (World Bank 2011, 2014). The Russian economy has a high demand for labour in sectors such as the oil and gas industries, construction, transportation and services.

Conceptual borders of identity and belonging in Russia have been redefined several times since independence. In the first post-Soviet years Russia was largely open to all kinds of migrants from the former USSR, providing them either with a certain protection status or simply allowing them to naturalise through simplified and relatively quick procedures (Ivakhniyuk 2003). Literally anyone from the post-Soviet space – regardless of their ethnic background – was seen as a metaphorical compatriot having the right to ask for Russian citizenship. Significant positive changes in the country's economic situation were followed by increased numbers of labour migrants mostly from Ukraine and Central Asia and, eventually, by growing xenophobia among a part of the population (Mukomel 2012). Against this background, the Russian government not only introduced restrictions on labour migration, but also introduced (in 2006) the formal state-sponsored programme of support for 'compatriots' defined by a number of criteria, including knowledge of the Russian language. Over time, very limited success of this programme (Iontsev and Ivakhniyuk 2013) has become obvious for the government that – yet again – has redefined the boundaries of belonging by relaxing the conditions for acquiring Russian citizenship.

Russia has also redefined its organisational boundaries, particularly regarding labour market access. In the 1990s Russian migration policy focused on the admission and (re)settlement of forced migrants from conflict regions, as well as of so-called 'Russian speakers' returning to their historic Motherland. In the 2000s, in line with the European trend and with the agenda of Russia–EU cooperation on migration, the priorities shifted to 'the fight against illegal immigration' with a focus on the control of territorial borders (Korneev 2012). This narrow-focused policy did not prove to be viable and was revised in March 2005 when the Security Council headed by the Russian President decided to liberalize Russia's migration strategy and reorient towards a more positive and open approach (Mukomel 2014), only then to be followed by a new wave of restrictions associated with a quota system introduced in 2007 (Schenk 2010). As it failed to meet business needs in a quick manner, the quota system was further supplemented in 2010 by a licensing system for low-skilled labour migrants to be employed by individuals without a work permit for a short renewable period. This allowed 516 000 migrants to be legalized in January–July 2011 (MPC 2013: 12).

In addition to state-level dynamics and interstate relations, the wider regional context of governance has also had important effects. The region has gradually been covered by a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements relating to migration, which led to an extremely complex system of migration legislation in the post-Soviet space (Ryazantsev and Korneev 2013). These agreements are proliferating in the context of a multi-vector and multi-speed (re)integration that has been occurring in the post-Soviet region for a number of years. Overlapping integration frameworks in the post-Soviet space that provide for very divergent degrees of integration for various combinations of states within the region may well place the post-Soviet space in-between NAFTA and the EU in terms of formality of their governance structures. These have also led to multiple, often overlapping, organisational and conceptual boundaries as regards differentiation between citizens of (at least some) post-Soviet countries and other countries for purposes of migration policies. Thus, for example, Russia has special preferential agreements with

Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan has preferential treatment of migrants from Kyrgyzstan. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia implemented preferential treatment for their migrants under the auspices of the trilateral Customs Union created in 2010. A good example of how such governance schemes have influenced migration dynamics is the 1996 bilateral agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on simplified procedure for acquiring citizenship that was in force until 2012. Experts acknowledge that this facilitated regime of acquiring citizenship of the Russian Federation was a significant pull factor for migrants from Kyrgyzstan (ICMPD 2011: 52). In 2010, the Russian census registered 103 000 ethnic Kyrgyzs in Russia (Ryazantsev and Korneev 2014: 19). According to the official statistics, from 1998 until 2012, more than 400 000 Kyrgyz nationals acquired Russian citizenship (Eurasian Development Bank 2013: 87). At the same time, researchers estimate that the number of Kyrgyz nationals who also have Russian citizenship is around 1 million (Ryazantsev and Korneev 2013). Whatever the real number of these people, their de-facto dual nationality is tolerated although not officially recognized by both Russia and Kyrgyzstan. This allows free access to the Russian labour market and, eventually, promotes circular labour mobility between the two countries, thus legally circumventing restrictions in the labour migration regime.

The Customs Union of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, as well as the even more ambitious Eurasian Economic Union that currently groups the same countries and Kyrgyzstan, is the most relevant regional integration structure related to migration. In 2010, the Customs Union member states signed an agreement that granted their citizens privileged access to the labour market in the territory of the Customs Union (Eurasian Development Bank 2012). If implemented successfully, this agreement would remove administrative barriers, including permits and workforce quotas for the mentioned categories of citizens. Some experts have noted that development of this 'legislative framework may lead to gradual harmonization of national legislation of the member states and formulation of common migration policy and common regulation' (Skachkova 2012). Although border controls are still in place, customs controls have already disappeared. It is expected that eventually in the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union, all citizens of its member states will have access to the Russian labour market comparable to that of Russian citizens, but we have yet to see the effects that newly accelerated Eurasian integration will have on migration patterns in the region. Boundary build-up here follows the geopolitical lines of the partnership with some of the post-Soviet countries that is reflected in migration preferences for their citizens. At the same time, the Russian border remains an important although very porous barrier for migrants from other countries in the region such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh, transiting through Central Asia on their way to Russia and onwards to EU countries.

The post-Soviet space provides an almost ideal-typical example of how major political transformations involving the disruption of long-established state and societal institutions can produce and shape migration within a region extending from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The dissolution of a single state and subsequent fortification of the new territorial borders in this region have had a profound impact on the dynamics of migration. A volatile political and policy context in the post-Soviet states – or, to some extent, governance failure in some of them – has also contributed to constant reshaping of organizational and conceptual boundaries that, in turn, have affected migration. Nowadays, both organisational and conceptual boundary build-up in the two major destination

countries of the region – Russia and Kazakhstan – is primarily being constructed along socio-economic lines, discursively filtering out low-skilled migrants regardless of their origin. These ‘walls’ are, however, supplemented by some new legislative ‘doors’ that create access not only for highly skilled labour migrants and compatriots, but also for other categories of migrants ready to take up multiple positions in the low-skilled sectors of the countries’ booming economies. New integration dynamics in the region give a promise of more liberal migration regulation that might again reshape migratory patterns, whereas new erupting conflicts can become drivers of new waves of forced migration.

## CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has explored the factors that render contingent the relationship between states and international migration and that are captured by discussion of regulation. It was argued that international migration is not solely and simply an external challenge to states and the state system, but is also shaped and conditioned by these states. In turn, this highlights the necessity of exploring the factors that can drive international migration and their relationship to the state system and to relations between states.

Of central importance are economic inequalities within and between states that play a hugely significant role in shaping international migration. It was, however, also noted that economic inequalities can also play an important role in keeping people where they are and affirming a sedentary bias in development policies that see migration as a problem (typically for states) and not as a potential solution (for individuals from poorer countries looking to improve their and their families life chances). In addition to economic factors, the chapter also identified the role that social, political, demographic and environmental factors can play in shaping and conditioning international migration.

The effects of and interactions between these potential drivers can lead to migration, as well as influencing the distance, duration and social composition of these flows. But, as with the effects of economic drivers, the impact of these potential drivers might actually work in ways that militate against migration and keep people in their place. By developing this argument the chapter has sought to explore how the underlying structure of the state system generates migration and, importantly, non-migration. The chapter then developed these insights by analysing developments in three major world regions with differing patterns of migration and forms of state. Significant differences were demonstrated between Europe, North America and the post-Soviet space, but through use of the idea of ‘boundary build-up’ it was shown how socio-economic, cultural and biophysical concerns about security can create a tension between openness to certain types of flows, such as those of goods and services, but also create resistance to other types of flows, such as movement by people. The result has been attempts to strengthen and reinforce borders controls, with small openings for certain types of privileged migrants such as the highly skilled. These tend to be based on an understanding of migration as a problem and threat, and not as a potential solution for those that find it difficult to sustain their livelihoods.

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